In my view, the evidence supports the argument that terrorism has been significantly degraded and pushed back, but not necessarily eliminated. This distinction is far more than mere semantics. Terrorist organisations, like other armed movements, adapt when confronted with sustained military pressure.
By Shu’aibu Usman Leman
There is no denying that Nigeria has made appreciable progress in the fight against terrorism, and that progress deserves to be acknowledged honestly and without reservation. Those of us who lived through the darkest years of the Boko Haram insurgency remember a very different Nigeria. Between 2013 and 2016, towns were overrun, military formations attacked, territories seized, and bombings became a frightening feature of everyday life. Boko Haram operated with an audacity that challenged the authority of the Nigerian state, while communities across the North-East lived under the constant threat of violence.
Today, that situation has changed significantly. The Nigerian Armed Forces, working alongside other security agencies and local vigilante groups, have degraded the operational capabilities of Boko Haram and ISWAP, recovered territories, and substantially reduced the frequency and scale of the large, coordinated attacks that once characterised the insurgency. The men and women of our Armed Forces have made enormous sacrifices to achieve these gains, often under extremely difficult conditions, and they deserve our commendation, gratitude, and continued support.
It is against this background that I understand the position recently expressed by the Minister of Defence, General Christopher Musa Rtd , on Channels Television’s Politics Today. Responding to a question about whether Nigeria had defeated terrorists or merely displaced them, General Musa stated: “Frankly speaking, we have [defeated terrorists] because now, like I said, the attacks are not as rampant and it is now kidnapping.”
The Minister explained that the nature of the threat has evolved, with kidnapping becoming more prevalent, suggesting that violent groups move along a spectrum from criminality to kidnapping, terrorism, and insurgency depending on the pressure they face from security forces.
I have great respect for the Minister, particularly given his experience and his responsibility for the nation’s defence. I also agree with the underlying point that the reduction in the frequency and brazenness of terrorist attacks is a major achievement. However, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that this means terrorism has been defeated.
In my view, the evidence supports the argument that terrorism has been significantly degraded and pushed back, but not necessarily eliminated. This distinction is far more than mere semantics. Terrorist organisations, like other armed movements, adapt when confronted with sustained military pressure. When they can no longer seize and hold territory, they retreat into difficult terrain; when they can no longer confront the military openly, they adopt asymmetric tactics; and when large-scale assaults become too difficult, they resort to improvised explosive devices, ambushes, targeted attacks, and kidnapping.
The fact that the nature of the violence has changed does not prove that the underlying threat has disappeared. Indeed, General Musa’s own observation that kidnapping has become more prevalent should prompt careful thought about what we mean by “defeated.” If terrorist networks have lost the ability to operate openly but retain the capacity to recruit, finance themselves, exploit vulnerable communities, and collaborate with criminal networks, it is far more accurate to say they have been weakened than defeated. An organisation does not need to occupy a town to remain a security threat; it only requires the capacity to survive, regenerate, and inflict violence when circumstances permit.
This is particularly crucial because the security challenges confronting Nigerians today cannot be neatly separated into categories like terrorism, banditry, and kidnapping. The boundaries frequently overlap where criminal groups, extremist organisations, and local networks interact. Kidnapping funds armed groups, criminal networks provide logistics, and areas with a weak government presence become fertile operating environments. For the ordinary citizen, these official distinctions hold little weight. A farmer prevented from accessing his land by armed men does not feel safer because his harassers are called kidnappers rather than terrorists. A parent whose child is abducted finds little comfort in the fact that a terrorist group has abandoned territorial occupation, and a traveller fearing highway abduction still lives with insecurity, regardless of the terminology used.
The ultimate purpose of security policy is not to reclassify violence, but to create an environment where citizens can live without fear. When a government declares that terrorism has been defeated, it inevitably shapes public expectations and policy priorities. It risks creating the impression that the most difficult phase has passed, and that the extraordinary levels of vigilance, intelligence gathering, and military investment required to keep a weakened enemy at bay can now be reduced. History is full of examples of armed movements that appeared defeated only to re-emerge under different circumstances and methods. Nigeria should therefore celebrate its security gains while remaining sufficiently cautious to recognise that counter-insurgency success must be fully consolidated before it is declared a final victory.
We have degraded terrorist organisations, disrupted their operations, reduced their capacity for large-scale attacks, and pushed them away from territorial control. These are remarkable achievements. But the next phase requires ensuring these groups cannot regenerate, rebuild financial networks, or exploit weak state presence. This demands sustained military pressure alongside effective intelligence, policing, border management, judicial capacity, community engagement, and socioeconomic interventions. Where poverty and alienation drive recruitment, or weak institutions allow criminal groups to flourish, military force alone cannot be the answer.
Above all, the alarming metastasis of mass abductions and highway abductions demands an immediate, uncompromising, and far more concerted national effort. Kidnapping has mutated into the primary economic oxygen and survival strategy of these fragmented syndicates. It terrorises communities, bankrupts families through extortion, and paralyses socio-economic life from our farms to our highways. We can no longer afford to treat kidnapping as a mere byproduct or a lesser subset of insecurity; it has become the central malignancy threatening our civic stability. Curbing this scourge requires total synergy across intelligence and security architectures, an aggressive dismantling of the financial conduits and ransom-laundering networks that sustain these criminals, and a zero-tolerance operational posture that treats every single abducted citizen as a national emergency.
For me, the real measure of victory is not simply a declining attack statistic. True victory is when a farmer can travel to his land without fear of abduction; when parents can send their children to school without worrying for their safety; when citizens can cross the country without calculating the risk of kidnapping; and when communities no longer live under the shadow of armed groups or negotiate with criminals simply to survive. By that standard, Nigeria has made undeniable progress, but we have not reached the point where we can confidently say terrorism has been defeated.
None of this is a criticism of the Nigerian Armed Forces; rather, recognising the remaining threat is the strongest form of support we can give those still fighting it. Our soldiers deserve the equipment, intelligence, logistics, and institutional backing necessary to consolidate their gains, alongside political leadership that understands counter-insurgency is rarely resolved through a single declaration of victory. If kidnapping is becoming a more attractive means of financing, the financial structures behind it must be targeted. If criminal networks are sustaining extremist organisations, those networks must be dismantled.
Nigeria should welcome the substantial progress highlighted by General Christopher Musa Rtd, while remaining cautious about the word “defeated.” Acknowledging that the enemy has adapted is essential to finishing the job. We should celebrate that Nigeria is no longer experiencing the scale of territorial insurgency that marked our darkest years, but we must not let that improvement breed complacency. The war has changed, and our strategy must change with it. Until the average Nigerian can farm, travel, work, worship, and sleep peacefully without fear, it remains premature to declare that terrorism has been completely defeated.
