By Prof. B.I.C Ijomah
It is this assumption of yours that I want to address. First of all it is not true that the North had bailed out Eastern Region or the Western Region. But you claim that even before independence none of the regions could live without Northern subvention. Let me draw your attention to the facts before independence. You should read W.M.M Geary’s work titled “Nigeria under the British Rule” published by the Cass and Company Limited, London (1927).
I draw your attention especially to pages 124 and 125. You will see published, General Revenue for the Northern and Southern Protectorates before the Amalgamation and the Percentage of Total Revenue originating from the North (figures in pounds), 1903 to 1913. You will see that contrary to your argument, it was indeed the South that was subsidizing the North. I am reproducing the tables here for clarity.
I also draw your attention to Abstracts of Revenue, 1809 to 1913. You will also see that the North could not have survived without the Imperial grant and the support of the South. When you look at the third table, Northern Nigeria revenue paid by the South and the Imperial grant, it will disabuse your mind and show you that without the South and the Imperial grant, the Northern government/states could not have existed.
Indeed, one of the reasons for the amalgamation was the fact that the British colonial government was tired of carrying the burden of the North and they thought that by merging the Southern and Northern protectorates, the country would be stable. Indeed, the circumstances that forced the British government to amalgamate the Northern protectorate and the Southern protectorate on January 1, 1914 were motivated neither by political exigencies nor by a closer cultural understanding among the diverse elements of the conglomeration that was later to be called Nigeria. It is obvious that the primary interest of the British government was economic.
It was also obvious that the Northern protectorate, because of its geographical location and cloudy economic prospects, was not likely to be viable. In fact, the Lugard administration was finding it rather difficult to maintain the Northern protectorate which was already running into deficit. Testifying to the financial difficulty of the North and the anticipated prosperity that would follow the projected amalgamation of the Northern protectorate with the Southern protectorate, Lord Lugard reported that “the prosperity of the Southern protectorate as evidenced by the liquor trade, had risen by 57 per cent. In fact, the liquor trade alone yielded a revenue of One Million, One Hundred and Thirty-Eight Thousand pounds (£1,138,000) in 1913. This he believed was the result of amalgamation of the Lagos colony with the Southern protectorate.
The Northern administration could not have survived without the imperial grant-in-aid which in the year before the amalgamation stood at One Hundred and Thirty Six thousand Pounds, (£136,000) and had averaged Three Hundred and Fourteen Thousand, Five Hundred Pounds (£314,500) for the eleven years ending in March, 1912. Besides, the burden of financing the North seemed to have been resisted and bitterly criticized by the Southerners. The expenditure of the British tax payer’s money in financing a colonial territory was a contradiction of the British colonial policy enunciated sixty (60) years before by L. Gray which stipulated that “the surest test for the soundness of measures for improvement of an uncivilized people is that they should be self-supporting.”
Economic position
This is by L. Gray in The Colonial Policy of the Administration of Lord Russell, London: Cass and Company Limited, 1853, page 281″. Further, the Northern protectorate was not only land-locked but bounded by territories that fell under the influence of other European powers. It was, therefore, inconceivable how the economic position would have improved without aid from the South.
The only alternative open to Lord Lugard was to amalgamate the North and the South and thus have a legitimate reason for the expenditure of revenue from the South in developing the North. Details of this manouevre was laid bare in a letter written by Lord Lugard on November 22, 1912 to his wife explaining how he had used the Southern resources to finance the Northern deficit.
Regardless of the merit which Sir F.D Lugard saw in his financial amalgamation of the South and the North, the prevalence of bitter criticism in the South shows the unpopularity of the amalgamation. At that time, the export from the South stood at Five Million, One Hundred and Twenty-Two Thousand Pounds (£5,232,000) while the export from the North stood at Two Hundred Thousand Pounds (£200,000) in 1910. This was very discouraging to the colonial system and called for urgent remedy. On Tuesday, January 31, 1911, there were attacks on the colonial secretary’s suggestion that the South should advance a loan of Two Hundred Thousand Pounds (£200,000) to the North for the completion of the Baro to Kano railway, in addition to the sum of One Million, Two Hundred and Thirty Thousand which was required from the South.
One of the criticisms of the Northern dependence on the South was voiced out by Honourable Sapara Williams who contended that before the loan was to be granted, the Secretary of State should settle the type of relationship that existed between Lagos and Zungeru, the two administrative headquarters for the South and the North respectively.
Existing hostility
He contended that as far as he was concerned, that the Southerners were strangers to anything connected with the railway after it has passed Offa, the last Yoruba town on the line. He referred to the existing hostility between the North and the South, particularly as regards the issues of extending the Northern boundary of the Southern protectorate to incorporate Yoruba territories now locked up in the Northern protectorate.
My dear Professor, the hostility of the Northerners towards the Southerners is not new in the Nigerian history. Even during the time of Sapara Williams, the Northerners did not see anything reasonable in the relationship with the South.
