Balance of power, balance of terror: The only panacea to rigging in 2027
By Sonny Ogulewe
My article titled “Why democracies in Africa fail” published by The Niche about three years ago is still valid today. In the article, I had alluded to Claude Ake’s preposition that “in Nigeria political power is made a top priority in all circumstances and sought by all means … and so absorbing that everything else, including development and human lives are marginalized” and compromised. As the 2027 elections approach, there are ominous indications that the preposition no longer seeks validation going by reports of outright hostility against the opposition parties across the states, which raises a difficult question of fairness and the credibility of the eventual outcomes of the forthcoming elections.
In Edo State, opposition figures have reportedly been harassed and prevented from campaigning, while the governor allegedly warned Mr. Peter Obi, the Presidential candidate of the NDC, that he must seek his permission before entering his state, amid threats of assault with an AK-47 reportedly issued by the APC State Chairman. In Delta State, hostility towards the opposition has become so pronounced that the NDC’s senatorial candidate has issued a daring threat to election riggers. In Ekiti State, the ADC secretariat in Ado-Ekiti was set ablaze, while in Benue State, Mr. Peter Obi was reportedly prevented from visiting victims of violent bandit attacks in the state by political thugs associated with the government of the state. In Kogi state, the ADC office in Dekina was vandalized by suspected political thugs linked to the state government. In Enugu State the government prevented Mr. Obi from using a paid event center for its town hall meeting in Enugu, while a member of the NDC was also reportedly killed by suspected political thugs during an airport reception for the Presidential candidate of the NDC. Meanwhile, in Lagos State, opposition figures face threats of physical harm, while campaign billboards are pulled down across the state.
Similarly, reports from Sokoto State indicate that the state government barred hotels in the state capital from accommodating guests scheduled to attend the flag off of the ADC Presidential campaign. In Kaduna State, the state government reportedly stopped a book lunch perceived to be critical of its policies. In Niger state, the government was accused of arbitrarily shutting down private radio and local broadcasting outlets over perceived political leanings. In Ebonyi state, two political thugs allegedly linked to the state government were reportedly gunned down while attacking the convey of the opposition party. These developments are ominous portends for the 2027 elections. The collapse of the First Republic offers enduring lessons about the dangers of political intolerance and the suppression of dissent. We must not mistake the apparent acquiescence of the populace in the face of shrinking space for an endorsement of these excesses or an indication of inability to resist them. Every effort must be made to protect political pluralism, uphold democratic freedoms and safeguard the integrity of electoral process.
Another difficult question which is consequential to the success of the 2027 election is whether it is possible to eliminate electoral rigging in a political environment where the perpetrators of electoral fraud may perceive little risk of resistance, exposure or punishment? The answer may lie in a principle that is as uncomfortable as it is compelling which is that the balance of terror can serve as a deterrent to the abuse of power. In the language of political strategy, this may be described as a balance of fear, not necessarily because political actors must resort to violence, but because no party should be so overwhelmingly dominant in its capacity to manipulate or intimidate that it can act without fear of consequences.
The argument deserves serious consideration. In a political system where electoral malpractice is suspected or alleged, where the political space is viciously narrowed and where the institutions responsible for preventing it are not always trusted by every participant, the prospect of a party imposing its will without meaningful resistance can become a dangerous incentive. When those who contemplate manipulation believe that their opponents lack the capacity to expose, challenge or frustrate their actions, the temptation to rig may become greater. Conversely, where the parties possess credible and relatively balanced capacities to protect their votes, document irregularities and mobilise lawful or unlawful resistance, the risks associated with electoral manipulation increase and ipso facto reduce electoral violence and rigging.
This is the strategic logic behind the concept of deterrence. It is not the mere possession of power that guarantees restraint; it is the knowledge that the misuse of that power will attract consequences. In international relations, the balance of power has often been understood as a mechanism for preventing one actor from exercising unrestrained dominance over others. Although electoral politics operates under different rules, the underlying principle remains relevant: unchecked power can encourage excesses, while credible constraints can discourage it.
Applied to Nigeria’s 2027 elections, this proposition presents a challenge to the political establishment and opposition alike. If a party believes it can deploy the machinery of government, influence electoral institutions, exploit security agencies or manipulate the collation process without encountering effective resistance, the formal existence of electoral laws may not, by itself, be sufficient to deter misconduct. The question is whether the institutions and political actors involved possess the independence, capacity and resolve to enforce the rules.
The opposition, therefore, cannot afford to approach the 2027 elections as a spectator waiting for electoral fairness to be bestowed upon it. It must build the organisational capacity to protect the democratic process. This includes credible polling-unit agents, trained observers, reliable communication systems, independent collation records, legal teams, equivalent rapid-response mechanisms and the ability to document and publicise irregularities. This would require cooperation among political parties wherever their shared interest in electoral integrity outweighs their immediate partisan differences.
A party that cannot adequately monitor its votes, preserve evidence of malpractice or challenge unlawful decisions is vulnerable. A party that can balance violent rigging, establish what happened at each stage of the process, mobilise legal remedies and sustain public scrutiny is better positioned to deter manipulation. The distinction is fundamental which essentially evaluates electoral strength not solely by the ability to win votes but also by the ability to legally canvass for support without restrictions, ensure that votes cast are accurately counted and faithfully declared.
Although, there may be a troubling interpretation of the balance-of-terror argument, but it is not sufficient to diminish its essence in a political space that that has been so deliberately narrowed by the government in power using the institutions of the state, outright violence and threats of violence. The argument is that parties must acquire comparable capacities for election violence before any of them will exercise restraint, which would engender an era of democratic deterrence and resetting. The assumption that fear of retaliation can restrain electoral misconduct is not without logic, but the consequences of normalising violence could be devastating. Once armed supporters, political thugs or rival groups begin to determine the boundaries of acceptable conduct, the election may cease to be a contest of ideas and become a struggle for physical survival. The state itself could become the principal casualty. Violence can intimidate voters, prevent access to polling stations, destroy electoral materials and compromise the freedom of citizens to make their choices. It can also provide a pretext for excessive security measures or the disruption of legitimate political activity. However, it is when Nigeria gets to this stage that she would begin to contemplate a political renaissance and tolerance.
The more sustainable interpretation of the balance-of-terror thesis is therefore a balance of deterrent capacity. Every party should possess sufficient organisational, legal, technological and civic capacity to make electoral fraud difficult to execute, easy to expose and costly to sustain. The objective is not to create competing centres of violence but to eliminate the conditions under which any political actor can reasonably expect to manipulate an election with impunity.
The Independent National Electoral Commission has a central responsibility in this equation. Transparency in accreditation, voting, transmission and collation; consistent application of electoral regulations; prompt publication of verifiable results; and credible mechanisms for resolving disputes can reduce opportunities for manipulation. Equally important is the conduct of security agencies, whose responsibility is to protect voters and electoral personnel impartially rather than serve the interests of any political faction. The courts must also provide timely and credible remedies where electoral rights have been violated.
Political parties must recognise, however, that institutional safeguards are strongest when citizens and competing political interests are organised enough to demand their enforcement. The integrity of an election cannot depend entirely on the goodwill of those who stand to benefit from manipulating it. Independent observation, public scrutiny, evidence-based reporting and peaceful civic mobilisation are essential counterweights to partisan influence.
This is where Nigeria’s political class must confront its own contradictions. Parties that condemn electoral manipulation when they are victims but tolerate it when they are beneficiaries undermine the moral and institutional foundations of democracy. Electoral integrity cannot be a principle invoked selectively. A party’s commitment to free and fair elections must survive both victory and defeat.
The 2027 elections will therefore test more than the popularity of candidates and the organisational strength of political parties. They will test whether Nigeria’s democratic institutions can withstand the pressure of intense political competition. The challenge is to ensure that no party, incumbent or opposition, possesses the practical freedom to substitute coercion or manipulation for the consent of the electorate. The argument that the APC could win 2027 elections on the strength of its accomplishments, if properly articulated and effectively communicated to the electorates, is credible. The party has a compelling opportunity to make its record the centerpiece of its campaign, rather than resorting to threats of violence, intimidation or political arm-twisting. Ultimately, a victory secured through persuasion, conviction and public confidence is far legitimate and sustainable than one pursued through coercion.
Ultimately, the most effective deterrent to rigging is not the fear that an opposing party can unleash equal violence. It is the certainty that electoral fraud will be detected, documented, challenged and punished, regardless of who commits it. Where institutions are weak, political actors may be tempted to rely on their own countervailing power. Where institutions are credible and citizens are organised, the need for such dangerous calculations diminishes.
The title Balance of Terror is deliberately provocative because it captures the anxiety surrounding elections in which political actors may believe that only the threat of resistance can restrain an opponent. But Nigeria must not confuse the capacity to defend democracy with the capacity to destroy it. A balance of terror built on violence may deter some abuses while creating others. A balance of democratic power, founded on credible institutions, vigilant citizens and effective accountability, offers a more durable foundation for electoral integrity.
As the country approaches 2027, the essential question is not whether political parties can frighten one another into restraint. It is whether Nigeria can construct an electoral environment in which nobody needs to resort to fear, intimidation or violence to secure the sanctity of the ballot. These are my thoughts. May democracy in Nigeria endure.
