Editor, Politics/Features, EMEKA ALEX DURU, analyses Boko Haram’s tactics of territorial occupation and the impact on corporate existence of the country.
By the close of last week, it had become apparent that the course and dimension of the Boko Haram menace had clearly gone beyond the initial assumption of restiveness or insurgency. Rather, the audacity of its activities and precision of its targets had shown the group as having more agenda than may have been imagined by Nigerian authorities.
Battle of Bama
By Wednesday, there were conflicting reports on what many had termed the “battle for Bama”. Bama is a major Borno city that has been bearing the brunt of Boko Haram onslaught in the last couple of weeks. Earlier, reports by an online medium, Sahara Reporters, had claimed that developments from Bama had indicated that the terrorist group had taken over control of the city.
According to the report, Bama, Borno’s second largest city, was attacked on Monday by the militants. It added that the initial attack was repelled by Nigerian troops, but the militants later regrouped and launched more attacks that saw soldiers retreating with fleeing civilians.
Residents were also quoted to have stated that the group had completely overrun the city and had hoisted its flag in the city centre.
Who is in charge?
By Tuesday, however, Borno State Deputy Governor, Zanna Mustapha, dismissed speculations that Boko Haram insurgents had taken over Bama, adding that the military was in charge.
Zanna, who talked to reporters in Maiduguri, the state capital, maintained that: “Bama has not fallen into the hands of the insurgents. The military is in control. The attack on Bama town on Monday was very unfortunate, but I want to re-assure our people that government is on top of the situation.”
Even with assurances from the deputy governor, the situation on the ground remained hazy. For example, while he advertised the impression of the government being on top of the situation, there were reports of over 2,000 residents who fled to Maiduguri from Bama being moved to the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Orientation Camp in the state capital to join other displaced persons.
Incursion to Adamawa, Yobe
Aside the assault on Bama, there had been reports of Boko Haram incursion to Gulak in Adamawa State and Buni Yadi in Yobe State. The same scorched earth strategy and eventual annexation was said to have been the case in all the captured towns.
The prelude to the current phase of insurgence began to unfold when the group over-ran a Mobile Police Training facility in Gwoza. By the time the dust of the invasion had settled, there were conflicting reports on the number of trainee police personnel that had been abducted, killed or out rightly missing.
Before the Gwoza incidence, Boko Haram had launched a massive assault on the country’s corporate existence and international reputation by its Monday, April 14 bomb blasts in Abuja and abduction of about 276 students of Government Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State.
Foreign intervention
The abduction, which laid bare the fault lines of the nation’s security network, saw some countries signifying interest or actually registering in the efforts to rescue the girls. United States of America (U.S.A.), United Kingdom (UK), France and China were among the countries to sign on in the crusade.
Though experts had noted that involvement of the countries would be limited to offering training and technical assistance, officials of the government had gone to town in celebration of their intervention. Curiously, more than five months after, there had not been clue on the whereabouts of the girls.
Analysts sympathetic to the government had tried to explain the obvious slow pace of action on the need to tread with caution, to avoid further bloodshed in an attempt to forcefully release the girls. Some had even insinuated that the insurgents were using the abducted girls as human shields and instruments of blackmail in engaging the government.
Terrorists’ bigger agenda
Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau.
But with the new phase of engagement that has clearly shifted from mere insurgency to territorial acquisition, Boko Haram is leaving no one in doubt that it has a bigger agenda that may not have been given a serious thought by the government.
Is the military overawed?
Critics blame the relative ease with which the insurgents appear to be having upper hand on failure of intelligence. Some even allege that the nation’s armed forces may have been overwhelmed by the insurgents.
But Dr. Jamiu Oluwatoki, Senior Lecturer in Department of History and International Studies, Lagos State University (LASU), approached the argument with a great deal of caution, stressing that intelligence, being a restricted area, is not one to be blatant about.
“When you talk about intelligence, you cannot be too blatant about it because it is a restricted area. So, the answer may be yes and no. Yes because we can do better than we are doing. We know that sometimes, though our intelligence agencies may not say it because it is against the ethics of their profession, when they don’t get enough to work with in terms of funds, it’s not in their tradition to say it out; they just do the best they can in such circumstance.
“But I can assure you that they can always do better if they are given the opportunity to do better. That is on one side. On another side, I will like to be contradicted, that when intelligence agencies give information to government, they are acted upon promptly,” he had told our reporter in an earlier encounter.
Ikenna Odife, a Senior Lecturer in History, Nnamdi Azikiwe University (NAU), Awka, also dismissed the insinuation of the military being overwhelmed by the terrorists.
He said: “I do not align myself to the idea that the Nigerian military is overwhelmed. I would rather say it has not been adequately and properly mobilised. Our military is not lacking in the human capacity to perform, neither are they bereft of the intelligence to rout the insurgents. The command of the Nigerian Armed Forces seems not to have provided the required military arsenal to enable the officers and men in the field to perform optimally. They also appear parsimonious in releasing fund for the acquisition of the requisite technology for effective intelligence gathering. After all, our officers and men had excelled in foreign missions. Why then can they not replicate or exhibit such feat in their fatherland?”
Many thus suggest that the government needs to muster the needed political will to deal with the Boko Haram issue decisively before its perceived success provides a template for other latent agitators in other parts of the country.
