Without Awo’s invaluable savvy as deputy chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Gowon’s most-trusted adviser, it is very doubtful if Nigeria would’ve been able to defeat Biafra in combat.
By Tiko Okoye
- Wrong decisions & missed opportunities
According to the source document – recently declassified secret American diplomatic dispatches – “The North was minded to use the civil war as a tool to reassert its dominance of national affairs…The northern section of the Nigerian military was the best equipped in the country. To ensure the region’s continued dominance, the British assigned most of the army and air force resources to the North. It was only the Navy’s they could not transfer.
“All the elite military schools were there. The headquarters of the infantry and artillery corps were there. Kaduna alone was home to the headquarters of the Nigerian Army’s 1st Division, Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (Army Depot), Air Force Training School and Nigerian Defence Academy. (On the other hand), the Eastern Region had seized a DC-3 and a Fokker F-27 from the Nigerian Air Force in April (1967, and) NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that docked in Calabar Port, was quickly made Biafran.”
There’s no doubt that the monopoly stranglehold the North had on military resources engendered enormous confidence among members of the Supreme Military Council dominated by domineering Northern officers and fostered excitement and eagerness to commence an invasion to “crush the rebellion in the Eastern Region” – a mission that virtually every one of them agreed would end in a matter of days, if not hours.
But the Biafran Military High Command held two jokers in its hand. First, the top officers “knew that Gowon wanted to respect the neutrality of (the) Midwest and not invade through (the) Niger Bridge, which would have driven the people of the Midwest into waiting Biafran hands…(but to make assurance doubly sure) the Niger Bridge had been mined using explosives with metal covering across the roadbed at the second pier out from the Eastern side…The Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were sworn enemies of Northern hegemony, would never join the North militarily or politically against the Biafrans.”
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Why did Ojukwu and his advisers make such foundational assumptions? “(Partly because) when Gowon vouched to ‘crush the rebellion,’ progressive Yoruba intellectuals deplored the language. Professor Hezekiah Oluwasanmi, Vice Chancellor of University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), described the use of the word as ‘unfortunate.’ Justice Kayode Eso of the Western Court of Appeal (and later Justice of the Supreme Court) said: ‘Crushing the East was not the way to make Nigeria one.’” And partly because of what the Biafran negotiating team surmised to be their understanding of discussions with the reconciliation team led by Awo.
“Mr Strong, the American consul in Ibadan,” one dispatch disclosed, “whom (progressive Yoruba intellectuals) had been speaking to, confidently wrote: ‘As intellectuals and modernizers, they see the conflict in terms of continuing determination of (the) conservative North to dominate the more advanced South’ and expressed fear that ‘once the North subdues (the) East, it will seek to assert outright dominance over the West. The center of trouble might then swing back to the West, where it all began.’” And herein laid the first major mistake Ojukwu and his advisers made.
Although a handful of the Yoruba intelligentsia – particularly Prof Wole Soyinka who made immense personal sacrifices for the Biafran cause – Ojukwu and his men allowed Awo to lull them into a false sense of security in the course of a couple of meetings the Ikenne-born sage held with them in Enugu soon after he was released from Calabar Prison.
Yet, without Awo’s invaluable savvy as deputy chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Gowon’s most-trusted adviser, it is very doubtful if Nigeria would’ve been able to defeat Biafra in combat. And who you think constituted the bulk of mid-level officers who commanded the brigades and battalions that did the actual fighting? You guessed right! Ojukwu’s placement of too much trust in the Yoruba was one of the major factors – if not the most critical factor – why Biafra eventually succumbed to the stifling economic blockade by Nigeria.
The only positive thing that came out of all this was that – going by the dossier – “The Biafrans understood, therefore, that their strongest defense perimeter would be along Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem and Nyanya in Ogoja Province, where they share border with the North. That was where they concentrated.” Their assessment was spot on, because exactly at 5am on Friday, July 6, 1967 the Nigerian Army released a fusillade of bullets and mortar bombs across the frontline in this sector.
This was where the second joker card held by the Biafrans came into play. Unbeknownst to the Nigerian authorities – and according to the US documents – “Ojukwu had been meticulously preparing for war at a very rapid pace as early as October 1966, after the second round of massacres (of Ndigbo) in the North…Alouette helicopters and a B-26 bomber were procured from the French Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company. Hank Warton, the German-American arms dealer, had been flying in Czech and Israeli arms via Spain and Portugal since October 1966.”
“Maj. Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be in Enugu in prison for his role in the 1966 coup, joined in training recruits in Abakiliki. Foreign mercenaries were training indoctrinated old people, young men and teenagers recruited as NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) in jungle warfare, bomb-making, mortar and other artillery firing. Ojukwu, through speeches, town hall meetings, market square performances and radio broadcasts, succeeded in convincing his people that their destiny was death or a separate state.”
The foregoing give the lie to those who posit that a major reason why Biafra lost the war was due to lack of adequate preparation. As a matter of fact, by the time the war actually started in July 1967, the Biafran military was more prepared than their Nigerian counterparts, and the outcomes of the early battles left no one in any doubt. If anything, I would say that the meticulous underground war preparations and secret arms stockpiles caused Ojukwu to make another grave error. He stubbornly refused to accept offers or concessions during peace talks that would’ve prevented further colossal loss of lives and infrastructural damages while granting the Eastern Region considerable amount of autonomy from Nigeria.
It was as if Ojukwu had crossed the Rubicon and there was no going back under any circumstances. And although he blamed the collapse of the Aburi Accord on Gowon for ‘reneging’ on the terms after learning from the British ambassador and Awo the full import of the agreements he had reached with Ojukwu, it was as if the latter deliberately, unilaterally announced the terms of settlement, contrary to the dictates of protocol, thereby providing Gowon with a convenient excusing from setting aside the Aburi Accord – just what Ojukwu clearly expected him to do!
“On July 8, after three days of fighting,” the US documents went further to reveal, “only four Biafran troops were dead and nine wounded in Obudu, while up to 100 Nigerian troops were dead, according to the Irish Embassy official, Eamon O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission Hospital in Obudu. (O’tuathail) said: ‘Forty-five (45) of the dead had already been buried and the villagers were seen carrying the heads of the remaining around town.’ In June before fighting started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: ‘Each Biafran soldier should bring back 10 or 20 Hausa heads.’”
“At Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize the bridge linking Obudu and Ogoja, but were beaten back by Biafran troops on 7 July at 1400hours. According to the New York Times’ Lloyd Garrison’s dispatch of 8 July: ‘The Biafran Air Force – a lone B-26 fighter bomber – flew sorties from Enugu today, bombing and strafing enemy columns.’” Tunde Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was returning from the frontlines, said the first Nigeria Army battalion in Ogoja area ‘was almost completely wiped out by a combination of mines and electrical devices (called Ogbunigwe – weapon of mass destruction – the Biafrans).’”
- Next week: Conclusion of the second part of this narrative.
